Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Ordinance: new safety requirements for CO₂ transport infrastructure

On 8 July 2026, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy published a ministerial draft of the Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Ordinance (Kohlendioxidleitungsverordnung, “KLtgV (draft)”). For the first time, the draft introduces uniform nationwide safety requirements for the construction, operation and inspection of CO₂ pipelines, implementing the ordinance-making powers set out in section 4c, nos. 3 to 7, 9 and 10 Carbon Dioxide Storage and Transport Act (Kohlendioxid-Speicherung-und-Transport-Gesetz, “KSpTG”). Rather than establishing a standalone safety regime, the draft builds on the High-Pressure Gas Pipeline Ordinance (Gashochdruckleitungsverordnung, “GasHDrLtgV”). The KLtgV (draft) therefore largely relies on the existing regulatory framework, while introducing a number of additional and modified provisions in section 3 KLtgV (draft) designed to address the specific challenges posed by CO₂ transport. For project developers and operators, the key questions will concern the scope and interpretation of these additional CO₂-specific requirements rather than the established framework of gas pipeline regulation.

Current legal framework

The KSpTG sets out the legal framework for the planning and construction of CO₂ pipelines. While still in its infancy, Germany’s CO₂ transport infrastructure is vital for carbon capture and storage (CCS), where CO₂ from industrial processes is captured, transported to suitable storage facilities and stored permanently in geological formations deep underground. Captured CO₂ may also be used in industrial applications through carbon capture and utilisation (CCU). CO₂ pipelines therefore provide a crucial link between capture sites and storage or utilisation facilities (see section 3, no. 6 KSpTG) and form a key part of Germany’s future CO₂ infrastructure.

Section 4a(3), sentence 2 KSpTG, already incorporates key elements of section 49 Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz, “EnWG”) for the technical requirements applicable to CO₂ pipelines. Under these provisions, pipelines may only be approved if they are constructed in accordance with generally accepted technical standards, with compliance presumed where the relevant technical rules of the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and Water (Deutscher Verein des Gas- und Wasserfaches e.V., “DVGW”) have been followed.

The KSpTG currently lacks dedicated provisions on the safety, operation and inspection of CO₂ pipelines. The proposed KLtgV seeks to fill this gap and create a uniform framework for the assessment of pipeline projects throughout Germany. The draft is deliberately modelled on the GasHDrLtgV, reflecting the regulator’s view that the risk profile of high-pressure gas pipelines under the EnWG is comparable to that of CO₂ pipelines under the KSpTG. This approach also enables both authorities and businesses to rely on established rules and procedures.

Key provisions of the ministerial draft

Unless the KLtgV (draft) provides otherwise, the provisions of the GasHDrLtgV (as amended) will also apply to the construction and operation of CO₂ pipelines. As a result, CO₂ pipelines will be subject to a comprehensive safety and monitoring system covering all stages of their life cycle – from construction and commissioning to operation. Key obligations include the marking of pipeline routes and key valves (see section 3(2) GasHDrLtgV), regular inspection of the pipeline corridor (see section 4(1), sentence 2, no. 1 GasHDrLtgV), and maintenance of a continuously available operations centre and emergency standby service (see section 4(1), sentence 2, no. 2 GasHDrLtgV). Operators must also comply with documentation requirements (see section 4(2) GasHDrLtgV) and implement a management system covering responsibilities, operational procedures and measures to ensure pipeline safety (see section 4(3) GasHDrLtgV).

By building on familiar rules and structures, the proposed approach provides greater regulatory certainty for authorities and businesses alike. Because the KLtgV (draft) refers to the GasHDrLtgV “as amended”, any changes to the latter will generally also apply to CO₂ pipelines. Where the KLtgV (draft) has its own provisions, however, these take precedence. The draft’s explanatory memorandum further clarifies that references in the GasHDrLtgV to DVGW technical rules are to be understood as references to the corresponding technical rules applicable to CO₂ pipelines.

CO2-specific safety requirements

• Phase behaviour and pressure states (section 3(1), no. 1 KLtgV (draft)): The draft requires the implementation of safety systems designed to prevent two-phase flow conditions during normal operation as well as during periods in which transport is temporarily suspended. As well as preventing impermissibly high overpressure, these systems are also intended to prevent sudden drops to impermissibly low pressure levels. The rationale is that pressure fluctuations can alter the thermodynamic state of CO₂ and potentially lead to safety-critical operating conditions. The draft therefore takes into account that a reduction in pressure may have different safety implications for CO₂ than for natural gas.
• Redundancy requirements for safety systems (section 3(1), no. 2 KLtgV (draft)): As under the rules applicable to high-pressure gas pipelines, the number and type of safety systems must be tailored to the operating mode and local conditions. The draft also introduces a functional redundancy requirement, meaning that if one safety system fails, another must be capable of performing the same function. The draft therefore goes beyond the requirements of the GasHDrLtgV, which does not provide for such redundancy for high-pressure gas pipelines.
• Topographically sensitive areas (section 3(1), no. 3 KLtgV (draft)): Where pipelines are routed through narrow corridors, valleys, and natural depressions, the increased risk associated with the oxygen-displacing effect of CO₂ must be minimised, taking into account the site-specific conditions. The explanatory memorandum cites, by way of example, monitoring equipment, ventilation and extraction measures, as well as organisational precautions such as access restrictions and personnel training. The provision may therefore already influence decisions on pipeline routing and the design of safety concepts.
• Operational disruptions and unauthorised interference (section 3(2) and (3) KLtgV (draft)): Unlike section 7(1) GasHDrLtgV, the draft does not require pipeline pressure to be reduced in response to abnormal operating conditions. Instead, immediate action must be taken to eliminate the hazard and restore safe operating conditions. Section 3(3) KLtgV (draft) also expands operators’ notification obligations by requiring them to report any unlawful interference or attempted interference with the pipeline or its monitoring facilities to the competent authority without delay.

Outlook and recommended action

The KLtgV establishes, for the first time, a uniform nationwide safety regime for CO₂ pipelines. To this end, the ministerial draft draws extensively on the regulatory framework governing high-pressure gas pipelines, while introducing additional CO₂-specific provisions, particularly with respect to phase behaviour, redundancy requirements for safety systems and protection in topographically sensitive areas.

The draft is still progressing through the legislative process and must still obtain Bundesrat approval before it can be enacted. According to the current wording, the KLtgV is due to enter into force on the day following its promulgation. Furthermore, the KSpTG is scheduled to be evaluated by 31 December 2027 and every four years thereafter. The evaluation will also take into account experience gained from the construction and operation of CO₂ transport infrastructure, as well as technical and scientific developments, which could result in future amendments to the KLtgV.

Companies planning, constructing or operating CO₂ pipelines should factor these proposed requirements into the technical design and cost estimates of future projects at an early stage. This is especially important not only for project developers and future network operators, but also industrial companies whose CCS or CCU projects depend on access to the emerging CO₂ transport infrastructure. Pending the conclusion of the legislative process, companies should closely monitor any changes to, or expansion of, the CO₂-specific safety requirements.